Introduction.l)
In this paper it is shown that the theory on (dis)equilibria with quantity rationing, as developed recently by a.o. Dréze (1975) , Benassy (1977) and Barro and Grossman (1976) , is appropriate to study economies where production takes place under increasing returns to scale. We consider a temporary equilibrium model with quantity rationing. There are three commodities (a single good, labour and money). Consumers sell labour, buy goods and hold money. The producer(s) use(s) labour as the only input to produce goods. Profits are transferred to government and there is a Pixed autonomous demand from government. This model was studied a.o. by Malinvaud (1977) , Bóhm (1978 and , Dehez and Gabszewicz (1977) , Gepts (1977) , Hildenbrand and Hildenbrand (1978) .
A model with a single firm is introduced in section 2 and in section 3 the (temporary) fixed price eguilibria (also called "disequilibria" by some authors) are studied under alternative assumptions on the production function (decreasing returns, constant returns and increasing returns).
It has been shown (Malinvaud (1977) ) that under decreasing returns to scale there can exist four different types of equilibria (plus intermediate cases): Walrasian, Classical, Keynesian and Repressed Inflation.
We show that under constant returns Classical equilibrium disappears and that under increasing returns only Keynesian and Repressed Inflation equilibrium (plus an intermediate case)
can occur. This is so, because in this case (the) producer(s) has always to be rationed in order to limit the production. In section 4 we consider the same economy with increasing returns but with different potential producers. A rationing scheme Por distributing goods demand or labour supply among firms is introduced by means of market share distributions. It appears that the existence of a fixed price equilibrium and the type of equilibrium I prefer to interpret the model of this paper as a(very simple) micro economic model (with aggregate consumption however), rather than as a macro economic model, as is often done in the literature (e.g. Malinvaud (1977) ). Particularly in the case of increasing returns, it seems not reasonable to aggregate implicitely over producers and a fortiori aggregation over different commodities seems not acceptable.
It seems worthwile to study increasing returns, since there are no firm grounds that decreasing returns are normal even in the short run.
Also it seems that some phenomena, frequently occurring in times of depression, like forced mergers and failures of firms, could be better explained if one assumes increasing returns. However, the use of a simple short run model like the present one for the analysis of increasing returns seems somewhat unrealistic, it has the advantage that some of the typical problems related to this phenomenon can be made clear.
Obviously, if decreasing returns start only at a very high level of production, a model with increasing returns is appropriate if this high level is not attained by any producer.
2. The model. The producer maximizes profit; the profit is transferred to the sutonomous sector (and not distributed among consumers). We consider fixedprice temporary equilibria for different values of w and m. This whole process (see Grandmont (1977) for a general treatment and Bóhm (1979) and Hildenbrand and Hildenbrand (1978) in relation to a model with rationing) is left implicit in the present paper. We shall introduce demand and supply by aggregate functions. We shall assume that these functions are homogenous of degree zero in P, W and M, so that they can be expressed in terms of real wages w-W~P~0 and real initial money holding m-W~P~0, hence it is also assumed that aggregate demand and supply only depend on total real money holdings m-Em. and not on the i distribution among consumers.
Total demand x for the good and total supply R, of labour by consumers are given by the constrained demand and supply functions: 
where 0~x~~is the total constraint on the good, indicating that consumers can buy at most x of tlie good, and 0~R~~is the total constraint on labour, indicating that at most k of labour can be sold. L is the maximum quantity of labour available. The constrained demand for money m1 is x-~and R-~indicate that there is no constraint on goods or labour.
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From A6, which requires that effective demand of goods and effective supply of labour increase and decrease respectively, after an increase of m, it follows that (8) aa~w'm'~'~)~0 and aa(w,m~X,~)~0 .
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By A7 an increase of the wage rate will always lead to both an increase of consumption and of savings (if 2, is binding or not); it implies that wage income will also increase, (but not necessarily labour supply).
However, these assumptions seem reasonable, they do not straightforwardly follow from utility maximizing behaviour of consumers (see Hildenbrand and Hildenbrand (1978) and also Van den Heuvel (1979) ). 
Government
The autonomous demand is g~0 and will be assumed fixed troughout this paper. The government is served by the producer by priority.
The producer
The firm uses labour input z~0 to produce output v~0. It does -8not hold money and does not invest in stock or assets, so there is no relation between present and future decisions. The technology is given by a production function
We shall assume f to be increasing and differentiable; f' and f" denote An example of a production function which is not regular is an increasing function f, such that its second derivative f" is first positive, then negative and then positive again, when z increases.
Equilibrium
We consider the economy Note that an equilibrium is defined in such a way that no equilibrium is possible, where government demand g is not completely satisfied.
By definition 2.5., only the following eight combinations of binding constraints are permitted:
Each of these combinations ccrresponds to a particular type of equilibrium: -~3-Let Q be the set of all pairs (w,m) E]R} , such that an equilibrium exists at (w,m). We assume (see Bóhm (1978) ): Proof: By A5:
Since However, we shall treat such equilibria as a single one, and speak about the equilibrium e(w,m), if t(w,m) is unique, in order to simplify terminology.
Eguilibria under different assumptions on production
In thís section we shall consider the equilibria that may occur fig. 3 ). Producers are not constrained;
note, however, that it is assumed that no rationing scheme is necessary for producers to select the correct points from the sets n(w) and y(w), (as is usual in equilibrium theory). 
Under assumptions A, B and C, Q-{(w,m)~w~a} if g~0. The decom-
position of Q is depicted in fig. 3, which may be compared with fig. 2 .
The point W, corresponding to a W-equilibrium is unique and by theorem 2.7 equilibria are unique for all ( w,m) E Q.
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Increasing returns
In the case of increasing returns, at given prices and wages, there is a minimum amount of sales necessary to make production profitable.
Above this minimum, profit increases with sales. This implies, that production is either not profitable at all, or the producer tries to maximize sales. So, the producer has always to be rationed, if prices are such that production is at all profitable. To say more we need two assumptions: 
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Hence~~0 . -equilibrium, then a(w,m) -Y(w), hence ( w,m) Clearly fRH and fgH need not coincide.
If e(w,m) is a PW
We define two "single firm" economies. The production function to be used depends on the type of equilibrium obtained. It could occur that at some (w,m), an I-equilibrium exists in ERH and that simultaneously in EgH there exists a K-equilibrium. Then clearly eH(w,m) contains both a K-and an I-equilibrium. It could also happen that at (w,m), ERH only has a K-equilibrium and that Egh only has an I-equilibrium. In that case eH(w,m) -QS. It seems that for the definition of an equilibrium in such a case an extension of the market share concept as considered above is required with firms rationed on different markets. (iii) if eh(w,m) is a K-ora KI-equilibrium,then eh-1(w,m) is a K-equí~l~rium; Also~(w,m;~,yh(w))~nh(w). By assumption A4, particularly (7), since nh(w)-nh-1(w) -w(Yh(w)-Yh-1(w)), it follows (b)~( w,m;~,Yh-1(w)) ' nh-1(w) .
So by (a), (b) and proposition 3.1., (w,m) E Qh-1 .
(ii) If (w,m) E Bnd Qh, then (nh(w),Yh(w)) E Bnd A(w,m). By (a) and (b) of (i), nh-1(w),yh-2(w)) E Int A(w,m). shifts to the right. So generally a sufficiently large increase of the real wage rate will cause that some firms have to leave the market. Conversely a decrease of real wages will attract new firms into the market.
I1ue to the more efficient use of labour by less firms, an increase of wages with decrease of the number of firms, may cause that an I-equilibrium is replaced by a K-equilibrium. Typically under increasing returns only equilibria can exist where at least the producers are rationed, so that Walrasian and Classical equilibria are excluded. The model considered in this paper is, however, very restrictive, since no investment is possible. It may be argued that fixed capital ought to be included in the model and that it is more likely than that the short run production function shows decreasing returns. In that case increasing returns are rather a long run phenomenon. Now increasing returns come into the picture when investment decisions are to be made, i.e. when it must be decided how much equipment and of what type shall be ordered. For these decisions not only the expected wages and prices ought to be taken into account, but also the expected rationing of goods sales and labour, and it will precisely be these constraints that limit the purchase of new equipment. Therefore it seems that, however with fixed capital and a decreasing returns-short run production funetion Classical and Walrasian equilibrium may occur, such equilibria cannot persist as soon as capital may be adjusted, if the long run-production function shows increasing returns, (even if prices and wages also vary).
We only considered fixed price equilibria in this paper. The model of section 4 seems also appropriate for the analysis of price making behaviour of firms. The stability concept of definition 4.3 should be extended by introducing the conditions under which no firm is inclined to change its price. (For a partial analysis see Weddepohl (1978 Weddepohl ( , 1979 .
It must be noted that the market shares, as introduced in section 4.1, may also be applied if there are decreasing returns and if the producers are rationed. These shares could vary over time, not only as a result of -35entry and exit of firms, but also as a function of selling activities by the firms.
All these problems need further research. In models where more than a single period is considered, the assumption that profits are transferred to the autonomous sector, is not reasonable. It should either be distributed among firms or have some relation to new investment.
